The Dieppe Raid - August 19, 1942
The Dieppe Raid, or Operation Jubilee, took place on August 19, 1942. Originally planned under the code name, Operation Rutter, the raid was an effort to conduct a division-size attack on a German occupied port city on the French Coast. With it the Allies hoped to test their assault capabilities, gather intelligence per the Germans’ response, and show the British public and Soviet Union their commitment to initiating a second front in Western Europe. The plan called for an assault on the city with a complement of roughly 5,000 Canadian troops (primarily 2nd Canadian Infantry Division), along with attacks by British commandos on the flanks to compromise coastal batteries that could be used to offset the assault in the center. From left to right, the attack plan called for raids on Yellow Beach through Orange Beach. The assault commenced at approximately 0500 hours and began with the commando raids on the left at Yellow Beach, near Berneval, and on the far right at Orange Beach near Varengeville. The attack on Orange was comprised of Commando Group 4 and 50 US Rangers. The attack at Berneval was executed by Command Group 3.
Command Group 3, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel John Durnford-Slater, was an elite, battalion sized commando unit. Formed in 1940, it participated in numerous commando raids including successful attacks on German occupied islands off the Norwegian coast as well as the failed assault on the Channel Island of Guernsey. For the Dieppe Raid, Command Group 3 was tasked with knocking out the coastal battery near Berneval, a collection of seven high-caliber guns capable of bombarding the main assault at Dieppe four miles to the west. Despite careful planning and training, and the fact that it was the first to hit shore, its mission was compromised almost immediately. Royal Navy landing craft were spotted by German patrol boats and the exchange of fire alerted area defenders. By the time Commando 3 reached the coast, only a minimum of its soldiers actually landed, and landed in the right place. The guns were hastily and heavily protected and the British Commandos were forced to retreat without completing their objective. Nevertheless, the engagements were heavy enough that the guns were never actually able to effectively shell the main Dieppe beaches or off-shore craft. In fact, there are no reports that the guns at Berneval did any substantial damage at all.
The Dieppe garrison was largely made up of 352. Infanterie-Division, but the area was also occupied by various Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine personnel. These troops handled a variety of duties, above and beyond traditional garrison work, given their location on the French coast of the English Channel, as well as their proximity to England itself. Among the units serving in the area were Luftwaffe troops employed with the task of tracking and listening to Allied air activity. Included in the area was 7. Ln.-Funkhorchkompanie RLM, probably subordinate to Luftnachrichten-Regiment Ob.d.L. and Seenot-Kommando 5 der Luftwaffe. They were specifically tasked to locate, observe and jam enemy radar transmissions. Serving in the vicinity of Bervaval, these signal troops were likely tasked with infantry duty as “alarm” troops when the August 19th attack came. One of these troops was a 19year-old Gefreiter from Berlin by the name of Hans Meinke (shown below). He was killed in action that day, very likely the result of engagements with Command Group 3.
The Dieppe garrison was largely made up of 352. Infanterie-Division, but the area was also occupied by various Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine personnel. These troops handled a variety of duties, above and beyond traditional garrison work, given their location on the French coast of the English Channel, as well as their proximity to England itself. Among the units serving in the area were Luftwaffe troops employed with the task of tracking and listening to Allied air activity. Included in the area was 7. Ln.-Funkhorchkompanie RLM, probably subordinate to Luftnachrichten-Regiment Ob.d.L. and Seenot-Kommando 5 der Luftwaffe. They were specifically tasked to locate, observe and jam enemy radar transmissions. Serving in the vicinity of Bervaval, these signal troops were likely tasked with infantry duty as “alarm” troops when the August 19th attack came. One of these troops was a 19year-old Gefreiter from Berlin by the name of Hans Meinke (shown below). He was killed in action that day, very likely the result of engagements with Command Group 3.
In response to his loss, or even some extraordinary act before or at the time of his death, Meinke was awarded the Iron Cross Second Class. As a result of his death, his cross was, naturally, sent to his next of kin. In this case, it was his father, living in a small flat on the Grazer Damm in the Friedenau section of Berlin. He received his Iron Cross in the mail along with award document and letter from his company commander in late September 1942. He is buried at Champigny-St.Andre, the German war cemetery in Normandy, France.
Shown above is Meinke's Iron Cross 2nd Class with original ribbon and packet. It is a "Round 3" variant, manufactured by Deschler & Sohn of Munich. His accompanying award document was prepared and authorized by Luftgau-Kommando Belgien-Nordfrankreich, and signed by General der Flieger Wilhelm Wimmer as commander.
Below is the letter, and accompanying feldpost envelope, sent via the command of Seenot-Kommando 5 der Luftwaffe, informing Meinke's father that he was awarded the Iron Cross for actions during the Dieppe Raid. It specifically mentions that the Iron Cross and award document are included.
Below is the letter, and accompanying feldpost envelope, sent via the command of Seenot-Kommando 5 der Luftwaffe, informing Meinke's father that he was awarded the Iron Cross for actions during the Dieppe Raid. It specifically mentions that the Iron Cross and award document are included.
Despite casualties such as that of Meinke and partial successes at Yellow, and especially Blue beaches, the Dieppe raid was a failure for the Allies. The main landing force at Dieppe was largely trapped on the beach by German obstacles and heavy and accurate artillery and small arms fire. The attack lasted only hours as the Canadians were ultimately thrown back into the Channel. Losses were enormous as almost 60% of the entire Allied invasion force was killed, wounded or captured. The Germans utilized the attack for propaganda purposes and may have even benefited from advanced warnings from double agents. Nevertheless, the Allies learned from the experience and were able to apply these lessons to amphibious assaults in North Africa, Italy and Normandy in 1942, 1943 and 1944, respectively.